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MICRO AND MACRO DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY UNDER THE




It is rare to write on poverty and underdevelopment in an European
Union (EU) member state, but it is timely. The consolidation of both
democracy and the market economy is far from being a closed issue in
Hungary, given the current economic, social, political and spatial proc-
esses. Hungarian economic and political elite consider the EU cohesion
funds as the opportunity for regional development. The New Hungary
Development Plan 2007-2013 of the Hungarian government and the
National Development Policy Concept both have explicit emphasis on
sustainable development of regionally integrated rural areas based on the
availability of EU ftands. Strengthening regional cohesion, improvement
of regional competitiveness and regional realignment are all big pledges
embedded into the process of regional development as foreseen by these
documents. In this attempt, the Hungarian govemment puts an emphasis
on the need for a developmentary state, which should respectively put in
place the conditions of market-conforming and sustainable economic
and social development in guarantee for the interests of future genera-
tions.'
In parallel to these goals at the macro-level, there are also micro
development programmes; a certain example of which is the develop-
ment project for Cserehát initiated by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and the previous Hungarian Ministry of Youth,
Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (ICSSZEM). In this
paper, I will illustrate the extent of rural poverty in Hungary on the basis
of my research in Cserehát and discuss whether the current institution-
alism regarding the distribution of the EU ftinds can solve the problem
of regional underdevelopment or not.
To observe how over-bureaucratised structures witliout a systematic
approach in the new EU members copes with the new actors and institu-
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tions of rural development will be a new challenge for social scientists.
After the local election in Autumn 2006 and in view of the EU cohesion
funds, the discussion in Hungary on how to (re) organise various devel-
opment councils at the local level and how to involve the local govem-
ments into the implementation of the govemment policies for develop-
ment at the central level accelerated. Therefore, on the one hand, given
the pending political crises and the extremely polarised political scene
between the opposition right-wing Fidesz and the left-liberal coalition
between MSZP and SZDSZ, every single step towards change is prone
to have very complex political implications.
In rural Hungary, on the other hand, civil society, local businesses,
local governments, minority self-governments and alike participate in
rural development projects ftinded by the EU as the actors. In order to
observe the efforts and the positioning of such structures, I have been a
participant observer at events for micro development project stake-
holders, which were organised by the Cserehát Programme at Homrogd
in March and Enes in August 2006. I have also visited certain project
sites in Cserehát and held interviews in Hungarian during Summer and
Autumn 2006 both with the mentors of projects, UNDP representatives
and grant recipients in various micro-regions. In brief, the organisation
and the implementation of the Cserehát programme towards regional
development illustrates a picture of micro-development efforts in
Hungary with human capacity building and rural development as its two
main aims.
Development cannot be understood as being directed towards some
fixed, static aim; it is towards dynamic processes. Alongside, it is not
towards passive adaptation, but active adaptability. And it is not directed
towards a self-sufficient survival, but towards the permanent competi-
tiveness in relation to the outside world. These points imply that devel-
opment (re)produces the conditions for further development, and hence
creates a momentum. Retaining a momentum of development is the
current phase of Europeanisation for the new members of the EU. The
shift from institutional convergence to developmental and competitive-
ness convergence is the current requirement of Europeanisation from the
new members. Their ability to achieve developmental breakthrough is
closely related to their shift from simple modemisation to reflexive
modemisation.2 The development concept of the MSZP-SZDSZ govem-
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ment and the national plan for development, and the institutional
overhaul illustrate whether Hungary can acquire such momentum or not.
Hence, under the theoretical guidance of Adam et al.'s approach to
development and further Europeanisation, in this article I will discuss
micro and macro development issues in Hungary focusing on the EU
cohesion funds. I start my discussion with background information on
poverty and underdevelopment in Cserehát.
Poverty and Underdevelopment in Hungary -
Cserehát as a Case Study
Poverty manifests itself in the forms of income inequality and
underdevelopment especially in rural enclaves in Hungiuy. Along with
poverty, a certain section of the society falling behind the rest is a strong
implication of underdevelopment.3 The situation of Roma is central to
poverty: the Hungarian Roma is secluded in small rural settlements with
more than 60 percent of them living in settlements with a population less
than 10,000 people. These are the settlements where de-industrialisation
after the end of communism has not been cured with later developments
in the service sector or agriculture."* The ongoing plight of Hungarian
Roma instigated a wave of emigration - this time to Sweden in Novem-
ber 2006, demonstrating a rare example of asylum claims by EU nation-
als in another EU country. Therefore, the Roma poverty is becoming an
issue more related to the EU, given the increase in the number of Gypsy
population in the EU after the latest enlargements to Bulgaria and
Romania. The future use of the cohesion flinds to alleviate such poverty
will be a central issue for the EU.
Poverty and inequality are multi-dimensional with a whole set of
deprivations. On the one hand, structural features of poverty such as
education, place of living, number of children, and employment tend to
converge with the ethnic background of the poor- namely the Roma- in
the case of those deprived. On the other, it is difficult to agree on the
composition of the Roma in Hungary. In an attempt to qualify a society
as internally diversified as Roma, sociologists resort to attributing "pur-
suing a Roma life style" or "becoming Roma as a result of poverty"5 to
people "considered to be" Roma. Along with other studies in this area,
my fieldwork over the Roma communities in various parts of Hungary
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also convinced me that the Roma, beyond a simple racial community, is
composed of an extremely mixed group of people. Hence, in this paper, I
tend to utilise "Roma" as a rather comprehensive and ascriptive qualifier
to refer to all those who fall into the category of the "unsuccessful"
other, who could not succeed to meet the requirements to survive with
human dignity in neo-liberal market economies.
This picture is very central to the process of economic change in
Hungary. During the long decades of socialism, the labour demand of an
extensive economy and compulsory primary education provided for the
possibility of a relative social mobility and integration of the Roma.
Nevertheiess, mass unemployment in the wake of the regime change
shook the foundations of this fi-agile social integration. High employ-
ment, which had evolved during the preceding decades, and resultant
secure livelihood were replaced with uncertain and low employment
based on odd jobs.^ Under these conditions, poverty broke out and
forged specific norms, lifestyles, and values. In this respect, the more
deprivation is spatially concentrated, the more intense its cultural and
generational effects can become. Socio-economic exclusion reinforced
by deprivation and lack of personal autonomy can thereby intensify such
effects.̂  Cserehát is an example of rural poverty in Hungary, where
deprivation has culminated in generating a perennial form of poverty.
Cserehát geographically refers to the valley between Hemád and
Bódva rivers in Hungary. There are almost 110,000 people living in the
region, a certain segment of whom are Roma. The unemployment rate in
this region is almost three times more than the average rate in Hungary.
The crisis of agriculture, mining industry, metallurgy, iron and steel
production with the regime change instigated extreme poverty in this
area.8 De-industrialisation and decline in agricultural productivity cul-
minated in poverty in and beyond Cserehát, especially hitting the Roma
after 1989. Re-privatisation in agriculture after 1989, rather than solving
problems of agriculture, resulted in a transfer of resources, gained
through privatisation, to consumption rather than bringing out solutions
for flindamental problems of agriculture.^
Although, in principle, after the regime change the new govemment
tried to promote family farming and reduce the collective sector, there is
little evidence that this transformation progressed during the first years
after transition. If the end of collectivism is a proof of progress, along
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with one can only note the plunder of the agricultural co-operatives'
equipment by members of middle management or their relatives. There
was an immediate reduction in the agricultural population by some 40
percent, accompanied by a dramatic redistribution of wealth in rural
Hungary. About a third of the population lost their jobs, having fprmed
the core of a new rural poor. This initiated the creation of a real rural
proletariat dependent upon competitive labour markets for jobs and on
informal markets for their subsistence.'0 Consequently, the loss of addi-
tional income drawn from the agricultural activity under communism,
which was particularly important for a large part of families' total
income in rural areas, the breakup of the large collectives and the con-
fusion over ownership rights led to a considerable drop in earnings of the
rural population." The Hungarian countryside, as a result, was dotted
with "rural ghettoes" populated by the "decapitated and abandoned"
Roma societies. In such societies not only does the adult population lose
its traditional means of well-being, but also there remains no successful
examples for the youngsters to follow in order to break out of poverty.
The new generation cannot absorb work habits'2 and a large number of
the children living in poverty do not have, in Bourdieu's terms, the pos-
sibility of "pedagogical contract."'3 Hence, the structural features of
poverty instigate a culture of poverty - a form of habitus - forging
poverty as such.'^
Another contributing factor to rural ghettoisation has been the
emigration of the well-to-do population. Cserehát has already seen mass
emigration during the agricultural collectivisation in the 1960s and after-
wards still at an incremental pace. The emigration particularly of well-
to-do peasants out of Cserehát first and foremost ended up in a major
market loss for the Gypsies. These peasants were not only the buyers of
what the Roma produced, but also were the intermediaries of the Roma's
produce to be sold in the markets. Peasants also made use of the Roma
for occasional low qualified work. Still a relatively favourable impact of
emigration was that the Roma moved into the empty houses when the
local peasants left and also received their gardens. Nevertheless, the
Roma - as the new owners - did not have related economic and cultural
capital to cultivate the land and even to start a simple family-based busi-
ness.'5 Therefore, the lack of social capital and persistent unemployment
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led to a convergence of disadvantages in the case of the poor in the
area. 16
The longitudinal fieldwork of Ladányi and Szelényi on the Roma
community and their working habits in a Cserehát village called
Csenyéte demonstrates the peculiar characteristics of the habitus of pov-
erty. The culture of poverty portrays three characteristics in Csenyéte:
extreme egalitarianism, the absence of trust and authority, and short-
sightedness. Ladányi and Szelényi present the Roma population as
always afraid of the outsider "taking advantage of them," which is
frequently repeated in interviews with the following phrase: az ô
zsírjukon akar meghizni es meggazdagodni, senki ne gazdagoljon az en
zsinoromon, munka nélkül pénz keressen. Ladányi and Szelényi argue
that the Gypsies want to see equality in every business deal and aid
distribution. That is how equality plays a very important role for the
Gypsy communities and they avoid its destruction even at the cost of
remaining unemployed. Hence, "either everyone has work or no one has
any" as the following Hungarian phrase repeated often in Ladányi and
Szelényi's interviews demonstrates: vagy legyen mindenkinek munkája,
vagy senkinek se legyen. In this picture, extreme egalitarianism becomes
destructive since such mentality does not build solidarity but envy.
Hence, in communities affected by poverty, at the root of solidarity is
the common experience of paucity.
However, Ladányi and Szelényi do not believe that the culture of
poverty is the reason for poverty. Instead, they state that this is response
to poverty that the needy foster while dealing with the daily hardships of
poverty. Culture of poverty is not an ethnical peculiarity: it cannot be
explained through ethnicity but with poverty itself. Hence, both poor
Roma and non-Roma are locked into this culture. Its roots are not in
ethnicity or tradition but in the life experiences of the extreme poor. And
once this culture (or habitus) is in place it gains relative autonomy, and
thus facilitates the reproduction of the conditions of poverty. This is
partly due to the poor and especially the poor Roma living often sub-
ordinate to patron-client relations. The poor Roma have a chronic lack of
reliance and there is no authority that they can rely on in case of need.
This is not their choice, but something they were bom into. As an
example, they are under significant disadvantage in the labour market,
that is why they need a protector or patron so that the injustices in the
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market affect them less and they can obtain such commodities for which
they have substantial need. It is indeed a challenge to bring together an
appropriate institutional framework to displace poverty with develop-
ment.'''
Though rural, Cserehát is in the vicinity of industrial centres.
Transportation links, however, are feeble between the region and the
towns ahd cities nearby. Most of the villagers lack private cars and are
dependent on the inter-city bus for transportation,'8 ¡n a previous study
on regional and local development efforts in the Czech Republic, Myant
and Smith" reached a conclusion that development depended on the
contacts that regions could establish beyond their boundaries, bringing
inward investment and expertise for the revitalisation of old industrial
areas. Cserehát is at the border with Slovakia. The UNDP tried to
establish the historical Miskolc-Kosice corridor of trade and operate a
common development programme for Eastem Slovakia and North-
Eastem Hungary. Re-introduction of the Miskolc-Kosice corridor for
trade and transportation will remove the unnatural estrangement of two
communities at both sides of the border from each other. After all, Mezei
writes that prior to the Trianon Treaty, in the absence of the border there
used to be important forms of co-operation and trade beneficial to both
sides.2O Given the current economic crisis, both sides of the border feel
the need for an extemal source of resources to launch common develop-
ment.
Simply, Cserehát would require an active and efficient state
involvement in mral development to help people break out from the con-
vergence of various disadvantages ending up in poverty. Nevertheless,
any commitment as such is prone to be very expensive since Cserehát
comprises small and sparse settlements devoid of a big population,2' At
the moment, the Hungarian govemment plans to decrease its involve-
ment in regional development to a minimum with the hope that the
amount promised by the EU will replace and surpass any govemmental
investment in development.
In the future, only a handful of settlements which cannot attract the
EU funds will continue to receive support from the government. More-
over, given the current economic crisis in Hungary with respect to the
budget deficit and the govemment's self-imposed push to qualify for the
Euro by the end of the decade, it is not possible for the state to pursue
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regional development with high costs. Even if the state could actively be
involved in developing Cserehát, lack of human capacity would have
still been an obstacle for development since many funds require writing
tender applications to which human capacity is of utmost importance.
In this picture, human capacity in building and the utilisation of
local resources in order to reach and sustain complex local development
are the main instruments of regional development. That is to say, if the
mayor of a small village is used to handling 70 million HUF, but sud-
denly receives 150 million HUF from a project application, s/he should
have enough capacity to utilise this money towards the true aims of their
projects.22 Thereby, along with building transportation networks and
public utilities to pursue macro-development, in parallel should run
micro projects to invest in human capacity building in backward areas
such as Cserehát. Hence, there is more to local development than the
intervention by the central government. The local nature of development
comes from the participation of local communities as initiators and
controllers of development relative to the national level developments or
those on levels higher than the regional one.23 The discussion in the final
sections of this paper will show whether the projected method for the
distribution of funds support an approach to development as such or not.
Beyond human capacity in the regions, the absorption capacity of
flinds by the local governments will be fundamental to the development
through the EU funds. Broadly defined, absorption capacity means the
ability of the local self-governments to use public and private ftinding
efficiently and effectively in a transparent manner in order to provide
public goods at higher quality and/or quantity as well as to ensure their
sustainable development. Based on this definition, there are three factors
which determine the absorption capacity of local self-governments: the
ability to raise the necessary own resources, mid-term planning and pro-
gramming capacity, and the quality and soundness of the international
controls system. Without adequate sources of their own revenues and an
unpredictable central resource transfer system, local self-governments
will find it difficult to apply EU support.̂ ** Hence, successful rural
development at the micro-level in poor regions entails infrastructural
investments going in tandem with human capacity building.25
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Cserehát Programme Format as a Form of Micro Development
In order to receive grants from the Cserehát project, applicants
should formulate a project body with various local involved. After a
thorough review of their applications by the UNDP, the project partici-
pants can receive up to 20 million Hungarian Forints for their projects.
However, they need to contribute 10 percent of this sum either through
their own finances or through voluntary work or services. There are ten
mentors responsible for ten geographical entities to assist various small
civic groups, local govemments, minority self-govemments, various
local or societal initiatives and firms to organise themselves and prepare
grant applications.^^ Their task is to bring together local initiatives and
enable the expression of share intentions immanently related to the rele-
vant landscape, locality and the municipalities. The mentors should put
these actors in co-operation with each other and assist them to prepare
necessary plans, bring funds and obtain additional funds, implement
projects.
In this effort, "bringing together intemational experience with local
knowledge is the secret of mentorship," in the words of the Cserehát
Programme leader Marta Márczis. The mentors' most important asset is
their ability for networking to bring together various local and civic
bodies together for grant applications. Placing the foundations of men-
torship on micro-regions is not coincidental: micro-regions, as spatial
units, are the scenes for most economic, commercial, infrastructural,
administrative and social relations among the local residents.27 None-
theless, lack of enough time in the area and local knowledge are frequent
complaints from the mentors themselves. My observation is that to an
extent that a mentor can relate her/himself to her/his micro-region, s/he
establishes more trust and eams further local knowledge and hence
contributes to the formation of more succinct projects. Yet, this relation
should not be limitless: the mentor should be able to objectively evaluate
the assets of projects and extend the project participants beyond a core
group of people to further participants in the same locality. And this
should be the relation of equals, rather than nurturing any inferiority or
superiority among the stakeholders.28
The mentorship scheme of the Cserehát programme resembles what
Kovách and Kucerová29 qualify as the emerging impact of project class
in mral development in Eastem Europe. Comparable evidence from the
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developing countries shows that the process of the fight against poverty
creates its own elite - separate fi"om the political elite, who is fi-equently
regarded as corrupt.30 This project class refers to primary actors who can
renew local communities. Hence, "projectification" in their terminology
means restructuring of local power, re-grouping of the local policy arena
and the emergence of a new social group. In this effort, the project class
becomes an expert class, which strengthens its legitimacy through man-
agerial skills and expertise knowledge. Moreover, those who could
establish good working relations with such a project class can also rise to
leadership positions within their communities. This is crucial to forge a
local leadership structure as long as the new leadership does not become
gate-keepers to fend off possible newcomers.
A relatively successful work format of the Cserehát programme
would illustrate a picture contrasting Ladányi and Szelényi's research
findings firom Csenyéte presented above, which suggest extreme egali-
tarianism as an obstacle for enrichment. According to Márczis, Ladányi
and Szelényi's findings are due to the lack of community feeling in
Csenyéte where the population composition changes constantly with
immigration and emigration, and hence are not applicable to the rest of
the Cserehát region. The project mentors also object to what Ladányi
and Szelényi suggested as extreme egalitarianism among the Gypsies.
Their experience from the wider area of Cserehát supported a general
view that the rural poor were willing to follow the best examples from
their communities in their attempts to enhance their socio-economic
positions. I will further discuss this issue in the next section when I
present examples of efficient projects implemented by various civil
society groups.
The role of the civil society in the Cserehát development pro-
gramme deserves due attention beyond the central function of mentor-
ship. The mentors should help to strengthen the local civil society
through ingraining cultural and social capital, through engaging various
partners and members of civic groups, local governments and firms in
development. Organisational success profits from an elusion of all
possible obstacles of general member participation in decision-making.
There is a need for interactive leadership (and mentorship in the case of
the Cserehát programme) in order to bring spontaneous local demands
on the political agenda. In an environment of stifled participation.
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participants carmot develop collective identities. Members' collective
identity and participation are proportional to their feelings of importance
in their organisations. Once the members of an organisation see concrete
policy results by means of their participation, they will have more
reasons to participate.3 ' Under the light of these normative claims, I will
discuss some examples from the field in the next section.
Sociat Capltat, Rural Development,
and Some Examples from thé Field
The literature on regional development refers to notions such as
social capitap2 and institutional thickness. These refer to a plethora of
institutions and partnerships of different kinds in co-operation towards
developing initiatives between the levels of govemment and the organi-
sations from the private and voluntary sectors. Often as a condition for
financial support, the EU also propagates such notions as development '̂'
and social capital becomes central to the discussion regarding devel-
opment. Putnam states that "economics does not predict civics, but civ-
ics does predict economics."34 Adam et al., nevertheless, have concerns
over the concept of civic tradition, civicness and civic involvement, and
whether they are equivalent to the notion of social capital or not.35 As an
example, they ask if membership in choirs, bird-watching associations or
other interest groups contribute to the development of entrepreneurship
and innovation. The bulk of the projects that the Cserehát programme
receives are exactly of the nature, which Adam et al. find inapt for rural
development. Nonetheless, I believe that these projects also have a
certain contribution to rural development.
If we were to take social capital as a "lubricant" oi" network organi-
sations, one of the problems of transition or post-socialist societies
appears to be connected with the domination of bureaucratic organisa-
tions. That is, with the insufficient diversity of ad hoc organisational
forms, bureaucratic types of organisation are maintained even in those
areas where different forms of organisation and management should
have been developed. As I will demonstrate in the following section, the
composition of local and regional govemance structures in Hungary are
examples of such bureaucracy. A higher level of development pre-
supposes project-based organisations that are not hierarchical, but with
flexible models of leadership and communication.36 In parallel, shared
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identity and concems of the state, civil society and the market forces can
positively influence the development processes. In this regard, social
capital facilitates productive activity and other forms of capital, and can
be wielded as actors pursue their given objectives.^' While at first
glance, some projects in Cserehát such as preservation of traditions,
cultural identities or local values seem distant to development, I suggest
that their capacity to foster social capital can bring these efforts to the
very heart of development discussions.
For local communities, it is cmcial to recognise and to diversity
their intemal assets and local values for innovation. Therefore, the
renovation of a Greek Catholic Church in the area or supporting a church
or Roma children's choir to teach the songs of their communities may
not only contribute to the touristic potential of the region but also to the
discovery of disguised potentials. Promoting the Roma culture may also
help re-fostering the old handicrafts and traditional medicines to create a
permanent source of income in the fliture.38 Cmcially, such activities
also bring people together from different backgrounds and hence tum
into cmcial means for overcoming segregation. As an example, employ-
ing Roma communities for renovation or building purposes can help to
displace certain prejudices about the work habits of this community
beyond providing odd jobs for them.39 One example is from a village in
the region, where the local govemment and the Roma association
applied for funds together to build both open and closed spaces for com-
munity events. Peculiar to this project, both the Roma and the non-Roma
were aware of the particularities of their local culture and the need to
maintain it. The creation of social capital was central to the success of
such development projects and, among many, I will portray four projects
as examples of rural development through social capital creation.
"Step-Forward" Association's projects are noteworthy with their
aim to bring together local Roma women. The project leader of Step-
Forward Association, a Roma woman with the name of Irénke, states:
[w]e should learn how to work together. Once we learn to work
together, we can continue and develop other programmes. The
local [minority Roma] self-government fell into pieces because
people were not active in it. [The mentor interrupts to remind her
that it fell apart because there were not very many people
registering themselves as Roma.] Success depends on working
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together and co-operating, but the men easily drop the idea of
working together. [The mentor interrupts once more to say that he
tried his best to introduce the men into working together, but he
was not as successful.] The men did not manage to start something
together as women did. (author's translation from Hungarian)
Irénke reported to the UNDP Programme Specialist that their association
has 23 members. The membership fiuctuates very fast nevertheless, with
people joining in and dropping out. At the time of the interview, there
were only two women present other than Irénke, accompanied by their
children. However, the rest Of the women were at a training session
running alongside the meeting. At that moment, Step-Forward was
preparing another grant application for 10-12 Roma girls to explore and
sing traditional Roma songs. The head of the new initiative was Irénke's
daughter. The Roma girls wanted to prepare for a Catholic song-fest in
Budapest in December 2006. They needed money for training and travel.
Step-Forward presented this ahd the previous projects as manifestations
of successful co-operation aniong the Roma youth and how the Roma
women can mobilise. This mobilisation has obvious consequences for
nurturing social capital. However, its social integration potential would
be questionable as long as it only catered to the Roma youth excluding
others from the same community.
It is important that the projects should also concentrate on social
integration programmes in the area in order to displace habits of discrim-
ination and social outcasting. A prior example from Taska, a small
village in Somogy county, showed that the Ministry withdrew approved
funds for building social houses for the Roma population on the grounds
that the new settlement would create a new and segregated Roma neigh-
bourhood.'to Cross-sectional linkages or networks can link organisations
of state, local business communities and civil society around problem
solving tasks. Specifically, the linkages between local governments and
Roma associations in Cserehát towards common projects can enforce
such cross-sectional linkages and networks. The next two examples
illustrate how difficult it is for such networks to come about.
The Rom-Som Foundation is one of the major funding recipients in
Cserehát. They have been processing their grant applications so far
through the involvement of the minority self-government in Tomor. The
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new Hungarian legislation on minority self-government, however,
requires the registration of at least 30 people from minority communities
prior to local elections. The local Roma have been unwilling to register
themselves out of a fear to declare themselves as Roma. Hence, the local
govemment in Tomor would possibly terminate after the local elections
in Autumn 2006. This would mean that the Rom-Som would miss a part-
ner and a legal entity in grant applications as László Siroki said. Beyond
missing a partner, however, the leaders of Rom-Som believed that the
local govemment was neither interested nor aware of their projects. They
have hence had a very unproductive working experience with the local
govemment. And if the project responsibilities would be delegated to the
local govemment after the termination of their minority self-govemment,
they would not be interested in pursuing their projects any longer.
Another complicating factor was that the Cserehát programme had sup-
ported the Roma applications in Tomor but not the local govemment's.
It seemed as if the mentor could not manage to bring together the Roma
community with the local govemment either. Under the past tensions
between the local government and the Roma community, however, the
future of the programmes in Tomor was uncertain during the time of the
interview.^'
Beyond the stated problems with the local government, I had a
chance to see some project efforts of the Rom-Som leadership. They had
a current project to buy trailers to transport piglets to the market. László
Siroki continues:
[t]here were ten of us who would like to breed pigs. Three to four
people withdrew from the project as a result of the problems with
the local govemment. And now we don't have to buy as many pigs
[accordingly in the first instance the project would support pig
purchases of 10 participants]. Now, we want to buy fewer pigs and
instead a trailer in order to take the piglets to market, (author's
translation from Hungarian)
The UNDP Programme Specialist stated that it was possible to change
the activities of the project. Nonetheless, once Siroki received this guar-
antee, he declared an even lower number of remaining participants and
inquired about the possibilities of channelling the remaining money for
other activities. Then, it was time for the UNDP Programme Specialist to
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stress that the UNDP preferred the participation of as many as possible
in projects. She continued to say that the UNDP's experience showed
that as long as the institutions had consolidated foundations, they did not
face major problems even after changes in govemment.
This project visit demonstrated various aspects of rural develop-
ment. First of all, in case the links between civil society and the local
governments are not institutionalised for mutual benefit, rural devel-
opment projects remain vulnerable. In such contexts, it is not at all
possible to refer to the social capital nurturing potential of projects, let
alone their sustainability for further development. I found the remarks of
the UNDP Programme Specialist timely in the sense that she gave
references to the importance of institutions. Nevertheless, the problems
with the local governments in the Hungarian context show the weakness
of the institutions of rural development. To this extent, I also found the
way the Rom-Som group pushed to transfer the remaining project money
for purchasing a trailer an itihibitor of social capital development as
well. As stated above, a very crucial problem with development projects
such as Cserehát is the possible emergence of a project class. Moreover,
the project class embedded in Rom-Som is composed of father and son
who have been making some riotable money out of project grants. While
this aspect of the programme is crucial to create local business initiatives
and help to remove the prejudices regarding the entrepreneurial
capacities of the Roma, this composition does not help tlie emergence of
social capital beyond family and kinship connection for sustainable
development.
I will review one more project regarding social capital creation. A
small village called Selyeb is the venue for a project called Roma
Bottom-Up Initiatives. I visited Selyeb in the company of the mentor of
the project and the UNDP Programme Specialist. The foundation repre-
sentative, a Roma man called Horváth, reported that they wanted to
demonstrate to their children that they could organise themselves around
a community project for planting trees. Horváth said:
The idea was to show the children how to work as a group. It has
been very difficult for us. We didn't do anything like this before.
For sixteen years there was no community in this village. Now we
have the willpower. We want to show it to the children. We didn't
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see any such willpower from our elderly, (author's translation
from Hungarian)
A man in the meeting also asserted:
On Sunday, we bought pencils, drawing sheets, and crayons for
kids at Tesco. For Roma, the education of kids is really important.
It is a Roma tradition in the area that the Roma kids draw paintings
on the walls. We want to maintain this tradition. We want to show
to the kids that if they could work together they can be productive.
{author's translation from Hungarian)
At that moment, the organisation needed money to buy an orchard
for peach trees. The Roma in this village do not own lands, but pick up
the peaches from the orchards of a landowner. Also, the association
needed more money to take the children on an excursion to the city.
Reportedly, the Roma children in this region have never been to the city.
When the UNDP Programme Specialist enquired what the association
did for the children in their localities, the chronic problems with the local
govemment surfaced. Horváth stated:
We received a promise from the local govemment to receive an
empty house as a community centre. There are problems with the
local govemment as the mayor lacks trust in us. I am even afraid of
walking by the mayor's office. We want to organise music and
dancing events, but the mayor wants us to breed pigs to eat. When
[the mentor] goes to the mayor's office, the mayor promises
everything, but in his absence he is not co-operating. [The mentor]
talks about the buildings in the village that our association could
take as a cultural house, but we cannot take any house as com-
munity centres. The mayor is not interested and because he has
power he would not care about the Gypsies, (author's translation
from Hungarian)
Another member of the same associated intermpted:
My children wanted to receive the Roma scholarship. They were
refused even a scholarship designed for Roma kids. The decisions
are on an unpredictable basis. That is why I decided to bring
together a minority govemment. But I need people to cooperate. I
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feel myself like anyone else, I am poor but proud. If the mayor
wouldn't care in the least about the Gypsies, then I felt that at least
someone should raise his voice for the Gypsies.''^ {author's
translation from Hungarian)
The mentor asks whether things would change in the event they could
have a minority govemment. The same responds:
If we have the same mayor, then there is a big question mark. We
don't want to be cross with the first man of the village. He is an
official. We need to establish our own officials first, (author's
translation from Hungarian)
This project shows the importance the participants ascribe to the
education of their children and nurturing their willpower. As such, their
words and aims are at odds with the usual prejudices about the Roma
population. The previous problem with the local govemment also
presented itself in the case of this project group. The mentor could not
bring the local govemment together with this association. This brings up
questions regarding the social integration potential of the project. What
is common to both projects discussed above is, however, their potential
for agricultural rejuvenation in the area.
The Roma Bottom-Up Initiative of Selyeb presented a good
example of the importance of institutionalising a community centre and
focusing on the youngsters. A more developed, glossy and highly refined
of its kinds it he Homrogd community centre. This centre provides child-
care services and mother-training programmes, providing free access
above all for Roma children in the region. It demonstrates that rather
than shop-window policy-making, funds for regional development
should be allocated with a real concept. The creation of such a centre is
crucial to bring about the operation of networks that can affect devel-
opment and generate change.''3 The adult education project at the
community centre runs parallel to the study rooms for Gypsy children.
At the centre, there is a vocational training programme for adults to
become cooks, plumbers, bricklayers, nannies, and civil society activists.
One of the teachers at the centre had great confidence in the programme,
but she was uncertain regarding its future. In her words, the sustain-
ability of the centre depended on the future availability of money.
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Local Governance, Finances, and the
Prospects for Regional Development
Refiecting on local governance in the Czech Republic, Myant and
Smith considered fragmented municipalities a lasting sign of post-
communism. Their isolation caused by their jealously-guarded auton-
omy, weakness to play much of a role in strategic decision, and
complaining of lack of support from above were, accordingly, the mani-
festations of post-communism. Myant and Smith have also considered
the low level of "partyisation" at the local level a condition that served
further to separate the local governments from effective political infiu-
ence.44 The Hungarian local governance structures also show that
creating a plethora of regional structures could not overcome the
isolation of smaller municipalities and failed to nurture a "multi-layered
civil society." There are many independent mayors in small settlements.
While a certain group of them might be affiliated with political parties,
an independent local governance often means isolation of the com-
munity .45 Transition to a multi-layered civil society, however, would
require overcoming the isolation of smaller municipalities and their
involvement in the regional strategy formulation.'íó
The Regional Development Act of 1996 in Hungary gave
momentum to the elaboration of a regional policy that relied on EU-
compatible regulation and decentralised institutional and financial
systems.''? The decentralisation of local governance under the 1996 Act,
however, also brought together a new hierarchy of institutions related to
regional development. At the top of the hierarchy is the National
Regional Development Council with the following ambiguous job
description:
The National Regional Development Council was established by
Act 21 of 1996 on Regional Development and County Planning as
a high-level forum for negotiations, as well as the representative
and assertion of interests. The Council functions as an organisation
to prepare decisions, make proposals, give opinions, and to co-
ordinate and make decisions, and consequently is also involved in
the formulation and enforcement of regional development policy.
The role of the council is extremely important since it has all the
capacity necessary to make an impact on the processes of national
territorial, development and regional policy, and co-ordinate
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political and professional considerations. The Council is the co-
ordinating body for national, regional, county and small regional
ideas as a democratic body."**
This council also appropriates a major importance to participation of
social actors and transparency. The website lists the decisions of the
Council, which have so far been approved unanimously without discus-
sion.49
Below the Council comes, in order: Regional Development Council
(RDC), County Development Council (CDC), and Territorial Develop-
ment council. In regards to rural development, the CDC prepares the
decisions on subsidies, inviting competitors and monitoring contests.
Kiss notes the most important aspect of such decentralisation was such
that the regional actors leamed about the EU rules of the tendering pro-
cedure, the practice of accounting for financial support and the practice
of monitoring.50 Yet, the experience from Cserehát shows that the
population of micro-regions could not quite generate such social and
cultural capital without the assistance of mentors, and hence the impacts
of decentralisation did not necessarily permeate enhanced grant appli-
cation ability in the region. The CDC, especially, remained invisible and
out of reach for many in Cserehát.5'
Overall, local govemance attempted to maintain the concept of
"partnership," relating to the horizontal inclusion ol' relevant social
actors and the vertical integration of the four-tiers (locality, micro-
region, county, central state). The CDC was planned to be the brain of
this development scheme. It originally consisted of the representative of
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Chairman of the
County General Assembly, the mayor of the town of county rank, the
representatives of the economic chambers, and the njpresentatives of
seven local agglomerations. In addition to these voting members, mem-
bers without voting rights were regularly invited to its meetings. Despite
its structure, the CDC could only formally guarantee a coiporatist format
of decision-making.52 Starting with the Orbán govemment in 1999, the
influence of the local govemments decreased in the CDCs in the face of
increasing central govemment interference and infiltration from various
ministries and authorities. The discussions in Hungary on the re-
structuring of regional development show that the National Development
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Agency is becoming more versatile than the earlier hierarchy of develop-
ment councils.
The current paradox for the Hungarian govemment is how to
increase infrastructural investments while decreasing the budget deficit.
To this extent, as I mentioned above, the govemment places its trust in
the cohesion and structural funds. The Hungarian govemment put into
implementation a National Development Plan for the efficient use of the
EU funds during 2007-2013. The stages of the implementation of the
plan give a certain impression that the hierarchy of development coun-
cils, established by law in 1996, will become irrelevant with the new
centralist organisation of development, controlled by the Prime Minister
even devoid of parliamentary auditing at the moment.
The govemment brou¿it together a National Development Agency
in charge of the implementation of the development plan. The Agency is
in charge of the cohesion policy funds (European Regional Development
Fund, Cohesion Fund, and the European Social Fund), Hungarian
national public contribution to such funds as well as the European Agri-
cultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Fisheries Fund.
The National Development Agency has established an elaborate hier-
archy of decision-making on the use of these fiinds. The highest body is
the National Development Council with the representatives from the
Regional Development Councils, the Prime Minister, the delegates of the
Economic and Social Council, Ministers and the Development Policy
Steering Committee members. The Council meets once per year. A close
inspection of decision-making structure, nevertheless, shows that the real
preparatory, proposing and co-ordinating body is the Development
Policy Steering Committee, which excludes the representatives from the
RDCs as well as the representatives of the Economic and Social Council.
This is an exclusive club of influential liberal SZDSZ (Alliance of Free
Democrats) and socialist MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) politicians.
The Managing Authorities of Regional Programs supervise Opera-
tional Programmes of the National Development Plan. These authorities
report to the Development Policy Steering Committee, giving the latter a
privileged role to co-ordinate development. Their decisions will affect
the use of the funds with respect to major environment and transpor-
tation investments. The New Hungary Development Plan rarely refers to
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the Regional Development Councils. Retaining and even extending cen-
tralist tendencies towards the RDCs, it states that
[p]articipation of the Govemment in the regional development
council grants professional and Govemment control (»f the deci-
sions. The Government bears ultimate responsibility for the imple-
mentation of regional programmes.53
The delegates of the RDCs and representatives of the local govemments,
the delegates from civil society groups with the representatives from
ministries and management authorities can monitor the running of the
operational programmes. This format suggests that the RDCs are dis-
posed to discuss decisions rather than be involved in the making of
decisions. Despite the promises by Gordon Bajnai, the then Head of the
National Development Agency, in September 2006 that the RDCs will
directly decide 20 percent of the uses of the EU finances, this is not
stated in the National Development Plan. Still, MSZP already also made
it possible for its county representatives to enter respective RDCs, which
their counties pertain, at various functions.54
Overall, the whole system of decision-making for the use of cohe-
sion ftands is built on the assumption that the Prime Minister has a strong
authority in running the National Development Council and the Devel-
opment Policy Steering Committee and can control the RDCs. In an
interview with the Hungarian weekly HVG, Commissioner Danuta
Hübner asserted the implicit approval of the Commission for centralising
the use of the cohesion ftinds.55 Given the ongoing political and eco-
nomic crisis in Hungary, however, it is not at all difficult to suppose that
the Prime Minister can be easily crippled in control of these bodies.
Moreover, the system of decision-making is far from the control of
Parliament. The Parliament does not have much say in the running of
Operational Programs either.56 A ftirther sign of centralism was the news
that the govemment had decided to handle the credits for the small- and
medium-sized companies from EU ftinds single-handedly through a
limited company called "Entrepreneurial Support Disburser"(Vállalkozói
Támogatáskozvetito Zrt.). The major drawback of handling the credits in
this manner was the distance of the company from the would-be
recipients situated in the countryside.57
306 East European Quarterly
In parallel, the left-liberal coalition also sought to impose changes
in the local govemment legislation collateral to austerity measures. The
govemment attempted to introduce "regional local govemments" in
order to transform the Hungarian regions into the EU statistical (NUTS
2) regions so that they could utilise the cohesion funds with more effi-
ciency. The govemment, in the end, could not win the approval of two-
thirds of the M.P.s for such public administration reform. The opposition
politicians saw this legislation as an effort to concentrate all adminis-
trative duties in big cities, and the end of the autonomy of the local gov-
emments.58 However, still, there are attempts at further centralisation. In
November 2006, under pressure from the State Reform Commissioner
Tivor Draskovics and the junior coalition partner SZDSZ, there emerged
an idea to disband a network of Commissioners for Small Settlements
(Kistérségi Megbízott Hálózat) and seven regional coordinator posi-
tions.59 Beyond the austerity measures and state reform, the advanta-
geous position of the commissioners in tender evaluation and the lack of
MSZP control after the local election victory of the opposition in
Autumn 2006, can be the reason why the govemment intends to dis-
continue with the network.60 It is a political tradition in Hungary to use
development funds to create a loyal group of voters for the party and
providing financial support for party cronies. The Fidesz govemment
between 1998-2002 was a prime example. In an interview, an expert of
the EU funds and corruption, Eszter Kósa stated that most of the cor-
mption happens in Hungary when the local govemments commission the
friendly companies to carry out projects during public procurement.^'
The inflow of EU funds for regional development, indeed, is prone to
encourage further cronyism.
After the local elections of Autumn 2006, there is an acute problem
of communication between the local stmctures and the central
govemment. In an attempt to bridge this gap - and possibly to supervise
project tenders - Gyurcsány attempted to bring together a conciliatory
forum for local govemments (onkományzati egyeztetö forum) in
November 2006.62 The Prime Minister intended this forum to be a
parity-based parliamentary committee to inspect the implementation of
the govemment programme. Alongside, the Prime Minister also wished
to change certain legislation in effect to local govemments and reform
the control of local govemment duties and affective finances.^^ in
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response to these conciliatory attempts of the government, Orbán in
haste also offered to bring together a body of local governance to sustain
his control of the newly elected mayors of Fidesz.^^ These current insti-
tutionalisation attempts, however, demonstrate the distance of the
political elite from the developmental problems at the micro-level. The
following quotation from an interview with a peasant in the daily
Magyar Nemzet illustrates the way common people regard this picture.
The real cooperative spirit to guarantee that the perseverance
of the small settlements should make sure that no one's inter-
ests are overshadowed. For that there is a need for the freedom
of local creativity rather than regulation at the central level.
This freedom should intensively attract the residents of the
localities in bringing out the decisions related to their personal
lives.̂ 5 {author's translation from Hungarian)
In the previous section, I have shown how "remoteness" affects the
residents of Cserehát and isolation sustains poverty. A complex set-up of
development-related institutions, local and national structures does not
create social capital as long as they are distant from the daily realities of
people in the regions. The plarmed distribution of EU cohesion fiands in
Hungary suggests institutional congestion and political strife at the
expense of the potential development with the cohesion funds. The
research on poor settlements in France and the US shows that organi-
sational density does not override isolation of the poor. In case of lack of
efficiency and co-ordination between the myriad public and semi-public
organisations - implanted in regional development - and the structural
inability of regional development programmes, a notion of passivity and
apathy will be common among the most dispossessed. Moreover, the
elites of such institutions may stand as nets between the poorer people
and the outside world as was the tendency in certain development
projects presented above. Dependency and dissatisfaction may thus
forma vicious cycle in which each reinforces the other. The prevalence
of development institutions may even accentuate a negative reputation
for a region - fuelling the spiral of stigmatisation and sociofugal strat-
egies that decrease social integration.^^ Under the light of this debate, I
will discuss in the next section, how macro- and micro-structures of
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development can be institutionalised to solve problems of regional
development in Hungary.
The Macro-structures of Development
and Development at the Micro-level
As regards the development issues and processes in Cserehát, I
illustrated above the impacts of the spatially-concentrated deprivation in
territorial isolation and the culture of poverty in decapitated societies on
perennial poverty. The absence of human capacity, the regional struc-
tures of multi-layered civil society, the means of transportation all
enhance underdevelopment and poverty in Cserehát. My empirical study
and interviews showed that overcoming isolation and outcasting through
social integration and cultivation of trust íind willpower could be the
format of development in the area. In this respect, given my discussion
in the section above, a just question is whether the current format of
local govemance and institutionalisation of development in Hungary can
provide this format or not? The paper in part responds that the currently
established institutions of development at the macro-level are not
capable of solving the developmental problems at the micro-level.
Beyond the endless criticisms from experts of regional development and
opposition politicians on the current format in Hungary, however, one
should rather concentrate simply on how to develop the poor regions.
Pal Tamas presented a study on various programme documents of
the Hungarian govemment. All talk about colourful changes, which will
be Hungary's destiny when the EU funds finally arrive. In Tamás's
words, these documents seem absolutely acceptable from a communi-
cation point of view. Nevertheless, it looks as if ideas, values, and goals
are all mixed up in these documents where everything one can ever think
about development is written. Instead, according to Tamas, these
programmes should pay more attention to the demographical situation
and the issue of poverty (especially in connection with Roma integra-
tion).67 Even so, the discussion above shows how far the institution-
alisation of development is from the localities in actual need. As a
criticism to the territorial development policies of the govemment, the
Mayor of Debrecen from Fidesz, Lajos Kósa, stated that today's system
of tenders are exclusively part of shop-window policy-making and funds
for regional development are allocated without a real concept.^^
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The EU priorities for rural development, in this respect, are as
follows: (1) the improvement of agricultural and forestry competi-
tiveness, (2) the improvement of environmental and rural status, (3) the
improvement of quality of life (diversification), and (4) the enhancement
of local capacities.69 The National Agricultural and Rural Development
Strategy 2007-2013 in Hungary also recognized that agricultural
rejuvenation can be a panacea for underdevelopment in the Hungarian
regions. In line with the EU priorities, it sets the five following develop-
mental goals: (1) agricultural structural change, (2) agricultural market
creation, (3) farming with care for the environment, (4) strong provincial
small companies, and (5) the development of local communities. These
goals are closely related to the development of human capacity.''O The
same programme also allocates a certain importance to developing qual-
ity of life, income and employment position of the villagers. As general
as these goals sound, in order to achieve these goals, the same strategy
calls for (1) strengthening the economic potential of the village and
development of firms; (2) sustainable utilisation of cultural and natural
values, and the development of communal life in the village; (3) the
development of local human capacity and expanding the knowledge and
information base of entrepreneurship, planning and execution.^' These
goals illustrate that the Hungarian projects will aim at developing human
capacity and infrastructure in tandem.
In an interview with the daily Magyar Hirlpa, József Gráf, the
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, stated that all aims of
rural development should serve the interests of agriculture and vice
versa. The aim is that the producer should not quit producing his/her
produce if s/he cannot live from it, but rather enhance his/her activity
circle. This activity circle can be agricultural tourism or else forestry.̂ z
In reality, rural development and the general restructuring of the econ-
omy can potentially lead to a substantial change in the interaction
pattems between society, state, and the firms. Creating a cohesion
between those activities not only at local farms, but also with other rural
exercises, is strategic as the Cserehát programme also demonstrated. At
the same time, there is a need to create synergies between the local and
regional eco-systems/specific farm styles, specific goods and services,
and localised food chains.^3
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However, Zoltán Gögös, the State Secretary of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development, has had critical remarks on this
approach. Gögös expressed that his Ministry thought that enhancing the
competitiveness of Hungarian agriculture should receive priority in
financing to cure the disadvantages of Hungary in agricultural modemi-
sation. The division of ftinds in this manner would assist the develop-
mentary vision of small companies. In response to a remark regarding
Brussels' wishes for Hungary to shift ftinding from support for competi-
tiveness to other structures, Gögös was articulate:
In concrete Bmssels would like us to place the funds directed for
the amelioration of competitiveness to the third (diversification)
axis. Whereas we argue that we would not be able to instigate
many non-agricultural - for instance touristic or other service
sector related - ideas with which we would acquire an enhanced
frame of sources. The service-social development oriented aims
would be mistaken if future-oriented competitive agriculture does
not keep the rural population in place. The Union emphasises that
we should not develop the countryside through agriculture, but
through enlarging the forms of subsistence. We, in retum, ask why
we do not appropriate priority to agricultural development since
Hungary has extraordinarily good agricultural facilities.'^ (author's
translation from Hungarian)
The projects supported in the frame of the Cserehát programme
also showed the emphasis of the intemational organisations on diversi-
fication of income-generating activities and tradition conservation in the
countryside. While this has a certain contribution to human capacity
building, even Aladar Horváth, the ex-President of the National Gypsy
Self-govemment, argues that the Gypsy problems are social, educational,
and social cohesion related rather than tradition-conserving.'^ Above, I
presented the importance of institutional thickness for sustainable devel-
opment at the micro-level and the problems related to that in Hungary
with examples from the institutions geared for development at the
macro-levei. To conclude, I want to introduce why institutional thickness
rather than institutional congestion is relevant and crucial for develop-
ment and the fight against rural poverty.
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Amin and Thrift note the factors that contribute towards the
construction of institutional thickness as follows: strong institutional
presence (institutions of different kinds, including: firms, financial
institutions, local chambers of commerce, training agencies, innovation
centres, clerical bodies, unions, govemment agencies providing prem-
ises, land, and infrastructure, business service organisations, marketing
boards - all or some of which can provide a basis for the growth of
particular local practices and collective representations. The current
attempts of institutionalisation in Hungary are nevertheless devoid of
allocating responsibilities to those institutions away from the centre,
Amin and Thrift continue that although the number and diversity of
institutions constitutes a necessary condition for the establishment of
institutional thickness, it is hardly a sufficient one. A collateral factor is
sustaining high levels of interaction amongst the institutions. The institu-
tions involved must be actively engaged with and conscious of each
other, displaying high levels of contact, co-operation, and information
interchange which may lead, in time, to a degree of mutual isomorphism.
These contacts and interchanges are often embodied in shared rules, con-
ventions, and knowledge which serve to constitute the social atmosphere
of a particular region. The interview results in the frame of the Cserehát
programme illustrated the distance between the local govemments and
the civic initiatives and the danger that the tradition-conserving-related
micro-development attempts may prevent social unity from coming into
existence. Moreover, a tendency to centralise and rest the development-
related institutions in the political personality and strength of the Prime
Minister will not provide for co-operation among various institutions.
In contrast to the current situation, in order for development, Amin
and Thrift assert the need for pattems of coalition, which will result in
the collective representation of what are normally sectional and serving
to socialise costs or control rogue behaviour. The participants in the set
of institutions should also be mutually aware that they are involved in a
common enterprise. This will almost certainly mean that there is a com-
monly held agenda, which the collection of institutions both depends
upon and develops. Hence, this thickness would continue to stimulate
entrepreneurship and consolidate the local embeddedness. What is of
most significance is not the presence of institutions per se, but rather the
process of institutionalisation, that is, the institutionalising processes that
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both underpin and stimulate a diffused entrepreneurship - a recognized
set of codes of conduct, supports, and practices which certain individuals
can dip into with relative ease. In this sense, institutions are very broadly
conceived to include not only formal organisations, but also more
informal conventions, habits and routines which are sustained over time
(and through space).76
This paper showed that at its current stage of development, the
Hungarian attempts at development are crippled by political instability,
lack of co-ordination and co-operation among institutions which should
otherwise be geared toward development. As long as the use of the EU
cohesion funds remains centralised, there is danger that micro-regional
development efforts will not be sustainable either.
Notes
1. Országos Fejlesztéspolitikai Koncepció II.Rész Célok és Eszközök a Sikeres
Magyarországért, 15.
2. Frane Adam, Matej Markovií, Borut RonCevié, and Mateví Tomäii, The
Challenges of Sustained Development. The Role of Socio-Cultural Factors in East-Central
Europe (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2005).
3. See as an example the interview with Zsuzsa HegedQs, sociologist member of
French Academy of Sciences, at Magyar Radió online, 14.12.2005.
4. Ferenc Babusik, "A szegénységtôl a kirekesztésig Elemzés a magyaroszági
cigánysag helyezetérol," Népszabadság Hétvége, 25.11.2006.
5. János Ladányi and Iván Szeiényi, A Kireksztettség Változó Formai (Budapest:
Napvilág Kiadó, 2004): 71-72.
6. Zsolt Spéder, A szegénység változó arcai. Tények és értelmezések (Budapest:
Századvég Kiadó, 2002).
7. Wilislawa Warzywoda-Kruszyñka, "The Poor of Large Cities: Is an Underclass
Forming? The Example of Welfare Recipients," in Micha) Buchowski, Eduard Conte, and
Carole Nagengast, eds., Poland beyond Communism: "Transition " in Critical Perspective
(Switzerland: University Press Fribourg, 2001), pp. 225-238 (pp. 225, 228-9).
8. István Mezei, "Hungarian and Slovakian Cross-Border Relations," in Györgyi
Barta, Eva G. Fekete, Iren Kukorelli Szorényiné, and Judit Timar, eds., Hungarian Spaces
and Places: Patterns of Transition (Pecs: Centre for Regional Studies, 2005).
9. István Harcsa, Imre Kovách, and Iván Szeiényi, "The Price of Privatization. The
Post-Communist Transformational Crisis of the Hungarian Agrarian System," in Iván
Szeiényi, ed.. Privatizing the Land: Rural Political Economy in Post-Communist Societies
(London: Routlegde Studies of Societies in Transition, 1998), pp. 214-245 (pp. 216-219).
10. Harcsa, Kovách, and Szeiényi, pp. 229, 232-33.
11. János Péter Kiss, "Dynamism in Backwardness? Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County
and Nyíregyháza in the 1990s," in Maartem Keune and József Nemes Nagy, eds.. Local
Micro and Macro Developments in Hungary under the
Glance of EU Cohesion Funds 313
Development, Institutions and Conflicts in Post-Socialist Hungary (Intemational Labour
Office, 2001), pp. 170-201 (p. 179).
12. Erna Sághy, "Élet Csenyétén Helybenjárók," Figyelö, 8-14.09.2006. See also
Ladányi and Szelényi, p. 86.
13. Warzywoda-Kruszyiíka, p. 235.
14. Ladányi and Szelényi, p. 88.
15. Ladányi and Szelényi, p. 86.
16. "Szegénységcsapdában," F/gye/o, 8-14.09.2005.
17. Ladányi and Szelényi, pp. 106-112.
18. Under the austerity measures, the Hungarian State Railway company MÁV is
closing certain routes in an effort to cut its deficits. See "Független vasutat alapitana Békés
megye," Magyar Hirlap, 8.07.2006. However, the railroad network is already very weak in
the region both for passenger and freight transportation. See http://www.bueker.net/
trainspotting/maps/hungarian-network/hungarian-network.gif for more infonnation.
19. Martin Myant and Simon Smith, "Regional Development and Post-Communist
Politics in a Czech Region," Europe-Asia Studies 58 (March 2006).
20. Mezei.
21. János Ladányi, "Párizs üzenete," HVG, 19.1.2005.
22. György Kocsis, "Forráskritika,"//W, 27.05.2006.
23. Iren Kukorelli Szorényiné, "Micro-regional Co-operation as a Hungarian Example
of Local Development," in Barta et al., eds., Hungarian Spaces and Places: Patterns of
Transition (Pecs: Centre for Regional Studies, 2005).
24. Arpad Rózsás and András Vigvári, "Absorption Capacity of Local Self-
Govemments in Hungary," in Attila Ágh, ed.. Institutional Design and Regional Capacity
Building in the Post-Accession Period (Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies,
2005).
25. "Kísérletezésre mar nine ido," Népszabadság, 13.07.2006.
26. Ibid.
27. Kukorelli Szorényiné, p. 348.
28.1 owe this remark to Marta Márczis.
29. Imre ICovách and Eva Kucerová, "The Project Class in Central Europe: Czech and
Hungarian Cases," Sociotogia Ruralis 46, January 2006.
30. Elisa P. Reis and Mick Moore, eds.. Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality
(London and New York: CROP/Intemational Studies in Poverty Research, Zed Books,
2005), pp. 1-25.
31. Umut Korkut, "Entrenched Elitism in Trade Unions in Poland and Romania: Can
it Offer an Explanation for Lack of Union Strength and Success," 7oMi-na/ of Economic and
Industrial Democracy 27 (February 2006), pp. 67-104.
32. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); 157 in Adam et al.. The Challenges of
Sustained Development.
33. Myant and Smith, pp. 148-49.
34. Putnam, p. 47.
35. Adam et al, p. 49.
36. Ibid., p. 52.
37. J. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," American Journal
of Sociology 94, Supp. (1998), pp. S95-S120.
314 East European Quarterly
38, Tamas Romhanyi, "Cserehát, a gyalogos övezet," Népszabadság Hétvége, March
11,2006,
39, Interview with Árpád Zsigmond, head of local minority government, Orkéiiy,
February 2,2006,
40, "FelejtsUk el a pályázatokat,,,," Magyar Nemzet, 8,11,2005.
41, The local govemment applied to receive some funding to renovate a "house of
sorrow" in Tomor. The project application failed. According to the Rom-Som representa-
tives, the reason was that there was not much to renovate at this very place,
42, During the time of the interview, Selyeb did not have minority self-government.
However, the community managed to register 84 of its members (with certain diñlculties)
and they believed that they would have a minority self-government elected eventually,
43, Kukorelli Szorényiné, p, 346,
44, Myant and Smith, p, 167,
45,1 have come across such trends in my interviews with civic groups in Nyírség right
after the pollution in River Tisza in 2001, In an interview, the project mentor Melinda Kassai
articulated similar insights form Cserehát,
46, Myant and Smith, p, 168,
47, Kiss, pp, 176-177,
48, See the Országos TerUletfejIesztésci Hivatal website for job definition of the
National Regional Development Council at http://www,oth,gov.huenhivatal_ott,php
49, Ibid,
50, Kiss, p, 183.
51, Interview with the project mentor Melinda Kassai, 12,12,2006, Budapest,
52, Melanie Tatur, "Hajdú-Bihar Case Study: Corporatist Partnership or Elitist
Clientelism?" in Melanie Tatur, ed,. The Making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe - The
Impact of Culture, Economic Structure and Institutions. Case Studies from Poland, Hungary,
Romania and Ukraine 1 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2004), pp. 356-395,
53, The New Hungary Development Plan 2007-2013, 138,
54, Hajnalka Cseke, "Kontrasztok," HVG, 21,12,2006-03,01,2007.
55, "Hayározotabb stratégiát szeretnék látni, HVG, 24,06,2006,
56, Interview with Balazs Szepesi, an ex-manager at the National Development
Office, predecessor of the current National Development Agency, Budapest, 16.08,2006,
57, Robert Romani, "Unios vállalkozói pénzek állami kézbôl," Népszabadság,
16.12.2006,
58, "Az ellenzék elutasitja az onkományzati régiók létrehozását," at http://www,
radio,hu/index,php?cikk_id=186378, 21,06,2006; Agota Szarka, "Szorzás osztás," Magyar
Nemzet Magazin, 15,07.2006; "Kitartanak a regionalizmus mellett," Magyar Hirlap,
28,07,2006; "Lamperth Monika teljes beszédének írott változata," available at
http://www,radio,hu/?cikk_id=199202 (08,10.2006), For an argument in favour of the
government's proposals, see Iván Illés, "Régiókat! De Mindemáron?," Népszabadság,
24,07,2006,
59, Megmaradnak a kistérségi megbizottak, de átszervezik a teljes hálósati rendszert,
http://www.uno,hu/news/story/226538, 13.11.2006,
60, Szilárd Szönyi, "Pártállam," Heti Válasz, 23,11,2006.
61, Interview, Klótildliget, 07,04,2006,
62, Hajnalka Joó, "Gyurcsány-gesztus az ellenzéknek, Orbán óvatosságra inti pártját,"
Magyar Hirlap, 21.11,2006,
Micro and Macro Developments in Hungary under the
Glance of EU Cohesion Funds 315
63. "Szócséplésbe fulladt a kormányfo es polgármesterek egyeztetése," Magyar
Hirlap, 2^.\\.2006.
64. Hajnalka Joó, "A régiókkal is számol a Fidesz onkormányzali testülele," Magyar
Hirlap, 16.11.2006.
65. Magyar Neimet Magazin, 15.07.2006.
66. Loïc J. D. Wacquant, "Red Belt, Black Belt: Racial Division, Class Inequality and
the State in the French Urban Periphery and the American Ghetto," in Enzo Mingione, ed.,
Urban Poverty and the Underclass (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), pp. 253-254.
67. Pal Tamas, "Úrjatanulás Az Országos Fejlesztéspolitikai Koncepcióról" [Learning
Anew About the Conception of Country Development Policy], Élet es Iradalom, 26.6.2006.
68. Magyar Demokrata, 23.12.2006.
69. Cserehát Programme, available at http://www.cserehat.siteset.liu/fajl.plip?id=3225
70. "Fenntartható fejlôdés az EU-s vidékpolitikában," VUággazdaság Rural
Development Special Issue, December 2006.
71. Available at http://www.fvm.hu/doc/upload/200512/avf_stTategia.pdf#search=
%22nemzeti%20agrar-videkfejlesztes%20terv%22
72. "Magyar agrárvilág két szemszögböl," Magyar Hirlap, 2.08.2006.
73. Jan Douwe van der Ploeg et al., "Rural Development: From Practices and Policies
towards Theories," Socioiogia Ruralis 40 (October 2000), pp. 391 -408.
74. Interview with Zoltán Görgös, "A versényképességre koncentrál az FM,"
VUággazdaság Rural Development Special Issue, December 2006.
75. Ferenc M. László, "Körörgetes k\ïe\é;' Magyar Narancs, 21.09.2006.
76. Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, "Living in the Global," Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift,
eds.. Globalization. Institutions, and Regional Development in Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994).

